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Abstract
This paper finds evidence that a public housing privatization
program produced adverse effects on housing transactions and the
economy in Hong Kong. A scheme announced in December 1997,
offering tenants an opportunity to buy their units at deeply
discounted prices, reduced public housing tenants’ bids for private
homes and adversely affected home transactions. This effect is
more pronounced than the effects of the Asian Financial Crisis. An
effect on housing prices is also indirectly demonstrated though a
demonstration that a structural break in the housing price
relationship occurred at the time the privatization program is
introduced. Declines in housing prices further eroded employment
and set off a vicious circle.
JEL Classification Number: E32, R21, R31
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1. Introduction
Privatization is often believed to be conducive to economic
efficiency. Even though this effect is still controversial, any
suggestion that privatization could lead to the erosion of wealth and
economic inefficiency would seem ludicrous to economists.
This paper presents evidence that suggests such a possibility. A
privatization scheme, if managed poorly, could lead to
counter-intuitive results. Working through the “housing ladder
effect,” or otherwise called the equity effect or the downpayment
effect, such as described by Stein(1995), Bardhan, Datta, Edelstein,
and Kim(2003), Ortalo-Magne and Rady(2003), privatizing public
housing cheaply could lead to the erosion of equity values among
homeowners, which could spread throughout the housing market
through the housing market quality continuum. The erosion of
wealth works dynamically, and wipes out any static efficiency gains
that could result from the privatization.
Hong Kong’s plunge into a major recession in the wake of the
Asian Financial Crisis (AFC), which broke out in October 1997, is a
mystery. The Hong Kong economy had been well known for its
legendary resilience. Despite a number of momentous setbacks,
which included the Great Proletariat Cultural Revolution in 1966
through 1976, two major oil crises that plunged most countries of the
world into recession during the 1970s, and several episodes of
financial and banking crises, not a single year since 1961 was there
recorded negative economic growth (See Table 1). Indeed the
Hang Seng Index plunged from over 1,700 in 1973 to little more
than 150 in 1975 without causing an economic decline in any of
these years. The banking crises of 1965-66 “at a point posed a
threat to the entire banking system in Hong Kong,”(Jao, 1993, p.
242), while those of 1982 to 1986 “were even bigger in scale and
produced more far-reaching repercussions.”(Jao, op.cit.).
In sharp contrast, the years during and following the Asian
Financial Crisis were far less tumultuous. Hong Kong’s major
trading partners, the US and Mainland China, continued to grow
2

rapidly during the time, while stock market declines were far milder
than what happened from 1973 to 1975. Moreover, not a single
bank failed. Yet the Hong Kong economy shrank by 5 per cent in
1998. This turnout deviated so much from predictions that Jao
referred to it as “one of the most bizarre and egregious failures in the
history of economic forecasting.”(Jao, 2001, p.140)
Table 1 also shows that the rebound in 1999 is extremely weak,
quite unlike the rebounds that followed earlier recessions.
The dramatic and sudden reversal of economic fortunes in 1998
was also strange. In a matter of a few months, Hong Kong’s
unemployment zoomed from 2.2 per cent in the last quarter of 1997
to 4.3 per cent in the second quarter of 1998. By the end of 1998,
the unemployment rate had reached a high of 6 per cent(Table 2).
The often-cited explanation for Hong Kong’s deep recession,
that the AFC burst the property price bubble and thus produced a
gigantic negative wealth effect, is simply unconvincing(Jao, 2001,
p.140). The transmission mechanism whereby the AFC burst the
property price bubble is not clear.
First, although foreign
participation in the office building sector was indeed quite
significant, foreign participation in the housing market has never
been significant. There is no evidence that a big withdrawal of
foreign capital from the housing market produced a collapse.
Second, although inter-bank interest rates went up in the wake of the
currency troubles in South East Asia, mortgage rates had been
relatively stable. Hong Kong had seen bigger mortgage rate hikes
before but had never encountered such serious depression in the
housing market1. Third, it is not true that confidence collapsed
overnight. Indicators suggest that people had regained confidence
not long after the Asian Financial Crisis(Table 3).
It is sometimes thought that with the opening up of China Hong
Kong’s middleman role, which had been important in supporting the
1

Some commentators cited high real interest rates as the culprit, but the deflation
that caused high real interest rates did not occur until late 1998, AFTER the major
collapse of housing prices.
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entire economy, was diminished. But China did not start opening
up in 1997 or 1998. The suddenness of the reversal suggests that
there may be other reasons. Moreover, an examination of trade
data, including service trade and merchandise trade, suggests that
Hong Kong’s decline in exports in the period after 1997 was in line
with decline in global trade, and was actually smaller relative to
Korea, Taiwan, the UK, or the US.
This paper offers an alternative explanation to Hong Kong’s
1998 recession.
The hypothesis is that a public housing
privatization scheme introduced by the government played an
important role in reducing existing home transactions and home
prices. The large increase in housing supply since 2000 also played
an important role in the deflationary process that started late 1998.
This hypothesis will be substantiated both by theory and by
statistical evidence.
The theory consists of two components. The first is that the
housing market is a continuum with a full range of qualities and
prices and that homeowners trade up to a better quality when they
have accumulated sufficient equity in their current homes. The
ability to trade up depends crucially on the prices of existing homes.
When prices collapse at the lower end of the market, they transmit
readily to higher quality homes with a noticeable shrinkage in
transaction volumes. We hypothesize that the very attractive prices
offered by the Housing Authority for sitting tenants to buy their own
units under the “Tenants Purchase Scheme,”(TPS) offering up to
88% discount on the estimated market price for buyers making a
quick decision to buy, made it unattractive for them to buy other
kinds of homes. Given their earlier documented significant
participation in the housing market this unavoidably caused home
prices to decline.
The second component points to home values as the most
significant form of asset for the community. A decline in home
values leads to a shrinkage in domestic consumption and domestic
investment, and hurts employment. Employment declines further
hurts home values in a vicious circle.
4

This paper introduces a new methodology that throws light on
the relative influence of the public housing privatization program
and the Asian Financial Crisis on housing transactions in Hong Kong.
We present indirect evidence that the housing privatization program
also adversely and significantly affected home prices through
demonstrating that a structural break in the housing price
relationship occurred at exactly the time the TPS policy took effect.
Finally, a decline in home prices is found to both Granger-cause and
be Granger-caused by a decline in employment.
Section 2 presents a review of Hong Kong’s housing market and
the public housing privatization program. Section 3 provides the data
description and outlines the statistical tests to be conducted.
Empirical evidence is presented in Section 4. The final section
presents the conclusions.
2. The Public Housing Privatization Program
Economists normally expect that a privatization program would
make the economy more efficient. The experience in Hong Kong
shows that this cannot be taken for granted. The circumstances in
which a privatization program is conducted, as well as how the
privatization takes place, play an important role in determining the
outcome.
On December 8, 1997, the Housing Authority in Hong Kong
announced that sitting tenants in designated public housing estates
could buy their own flats at up to 88% discount off the estimated
market price. The move was cheered by the local press and thought
to engender a large positive wealth effect that would boost
consumption and give Hong Kong’s economic growth a big push.
However, what transpired was a big and immediate economic
slump. In the first quarter of 1998, the Hong Kong economy
declined sharply by an unprecedented 12 per cent on a
quarter-to-quarter basis(not seasonally adjusted) and Hong Kong
suffered a loss of 80,000 jobs—a sharp reversal from the 77,000 job
growth in the preceding quarter.
5

The first quarter GDP decline was puzzling not only because of
its magnitude but also because of the apparent favorable
circumstances of the economy. The currency turmoil had shown
signs of stabilizing, to the extent that it actually allowed one interest
rate drop. The HK Policy Research Institute’s housing property
confidence index shot up from 35.5 in January to 94.2 in March
1998. The Heng Seng index rose 7.4 per cent in the quarter.
What explained this sudden and dramatic reversal amid signs of
revival of investor confidence? The hypothesis that we advance in
this paper, to be tested using various statistical tests, is that the
public housing privatization scheme actually severed the housing
ladder that had been in effect for years prior to the announcement of
the TPS. There was evidence that public housing tenants had been
important players in the housing market. In a survey in 1992,
which was conducted by the Housing Authority, it was found that 24
percent of all housing transactions were due to public housing
tenants and that 13 per cent of all public housing tenants already
owned at least one residential property. Starting in April 1987, the
Housing Authority had been implementing a policy to make the
richer tenants with at least 10 year residence in the public rent
housing estate to pay higher rent2. This provided a big incentive
for the better-off tenants to buy homes as a back-up in the event they
were asked to pay higher rent. The TPS effectively reversed this
policy, for from now on rich tenants needed not leave. They were
offered an opportunity to capitalize all their future rental subsidies
through a purchase decision.
As expected, the demand for Home Ownership Scheme(HOS)
housing—a
government
subsidized
homeownership
scheme—suddenly collapsed. HOS housing used to attract many
2

In essence, the policy requires that tenants who have been accommodated for
over ten years be subjected to a means test. If the household income exceeds three
times that of the maximum eligibility limit, it will have to pay double the standard
rent. Those who have breached stipulated income and asset thresholds are required
to pay market rent. See “Safeguarding Rational Allocation of Public Housing
Resources: A Consultation Document” published by the Hong Kong Housing
Authority in December 1995.
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public housing tenant to buy. Indeed they were always many times
oversubscribed ever since the scheme started in 1978.
Disappointed buyers would have to buy in the open market, where
HOS units fetched very high prices, reflecting again the strong
buying power enjoyed by the richer tenants. Starting in June 1997,
the Housing Authority allowed HOS owners to resell, after two years
from their dates of original purchase, their units to public housing
tenants and other Green Form Applicants without having to repay
the land premium. Records of such transactions indicate that public
housing tenant buyers were paying very high prices for these flats,
indicating their strong purchasing power.3 With the announcement
of the TPS, HOS units suddenly lost their appeal, because in
comparison they were ridiculously expensive. Some 250,000 HOS
owners suddenly found that their units could hardly find buyers.
Immediately they found difficulty trading up to better homes in the
private housing market. Transactions in the existing home market
plunged, in turn freezing transactions in the new homes market,
which at the time almost exclusively depended on buyers trading up
(see Table 4).
Since public housing tenants were the primary source of buyers
for HOS housing, the effect of TPS on HOS housing market was
immediate. HOS housing owners found that buyers had suddenly
disappeared and were no longer able to trade up. Similarly, other
homeowners who depended on HOS buyers as their principal buyers
also could not trade up because they also could not find buyers.
Notwithstanding a highly stimulative budget in 1998 providing
generous tax relief, generous home starter loans, and an
unprecedented tax allowance given to homeowners for the mortgage
interest payments, the housing market continued to fall. By 1999
3

Transactions with prices were downloadable from the Housing Authority
webpage but the information is all in Chinese. Starting in 2003 data earlier than
2002 were no longer downloadable. However, we had examined the earlier records
and found one transaction at 3.95 million Hong Kong dollars for a 644 square feet flat
in Kowloon in September 1997. This was not an exceptional case in 1997.
Watanabe(1998) provided figures showing that public housing tenants generally saved
much more than either HOS or private housing owners as well as private housing
tenants, particularly in 1994/95.
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the Asian Financial Crisis was over. There was no longer any
premium on Hong Kong dollar’s forward exchange rates, and real
estate prices had risen markedly in Singapore 4 . Hong Kong’s
housing prices, however, continued to decline. Even the 10.2 per
cent growth in 2000 failed to lift prices, as home prices continued to
slip by another 14 to 15 per cent. By September 2001 they had
fallen back to levels reached 10 years ago. By 2003 housing prices
generally had lost over 65 per cent or more of their 1997 values.
3. The Statistical Tests
Three statistical tests provide support to our theory. The first
one (the “effect on transactions” test) is to show that TPS was the
key factor behind the big drop in existing home transactions. In a
multivariate regression controlling the effects of various factors on
existing home transactions, the TPS dummy was found to explain
the decline in home transactions far better than the Financial Crisis
dummy. The second test(the “timing test”) shows that, while exports
had been the driving factor behind housing prices this relationship
between exports and housing prices showed a structural change after
1997. Using the Johansen co-integration model with both an
intercept and an interactive TPS/exports dummy, we found a
structural break at the time of the announcement of the TPS. This
suggests that housing probably serve as a transmission mechanism
between the external (the exports) sector and the domestic sector, but
this mechanism appears to have been severed by the TPS policy.
Finally, the third test(the “effect on employment” test) shows that
housing prices and employment are co-integrated so a collapse in
housing prices would have a serious effect on employment. Our
statistical results indicate that the reverse causality also holds, so that
a vicious circle forms, rendering it difficult to launch a convincing
recovery.
The Data
In the first test, the focus of analysis is second-hand transaction
volume for private sector residential properties. This variable is of
4

Singapore housing prices fell again subsequent to the bursting of the IT bubble.
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great interest because normally when a homeowner sells his property
he would buy another. In contrast, to the extent that new housing
has already been produced and a new home purchase represents only
a transfer from the developer’s inventory to the homebuyer, buying
an existing home generates more additional economic activities than
when a household buys a new unit from the developer5.
The housing price of private domestic flats is treated as a
variable to explain second-hand transactions. The data on this
variable is the monthly housing price index of private domestic units,
which is supplied by the Rating and Valuation Department of the
Government. The period covered in this study is from July 1995 to
March 2004. Second-hand transaction data is not available before
July 1995. The period covered both the Asian Financial Crisis and
the Tenants Purchase Scheme(TPS)—the public housing
privatization program of the Housing Authority.
Besides, dummy variables are used to capture the effects of key
changes in the environment, namely the Financial Crisis
Dummy(FCD) and the Tenants Purchase Scheme (TPS) - as well as
a dummy to control the first quarter effect of home purchase pattern
(FQR) which may affect transaction volume 6 . During times of
acute loss of confidence such as resulting from the Asian Financial
Crisis, the local currency is subjected to tremendous pressures to
depreciate. While the spot exchange rate holds its place a
considerable discount in the value of the local currency appears in
the forward market. We therefore find it convenient to use the
forward market premium of the US dollar over the spot market
exchange rate as an instrument to measure the degree of the financial
crisis. An important advantage of using this dummy over an
“on-off” dummy is that there is no need to make arbitrary decision as
to when the financial crisis is “switched on” and when it is
“switched off.” In order to facilitate interpretation, we normalize
this variable to set the maximum value of this dummy within the
5

A “tree” of second hand transactions usually ends up in a first hand high end
property. On the other hand, if a first time buyer buys a new home the economic
stimulation is more limited.
6
This effect has to do with the fact that Chinese New Year falls in the first quarter.
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observation period to unity 7 . FCD is therefore a non-binary,
continuous dummy free from arbitrary assumption about when the
financial crisis set in and when it phased out. Since the TPS was
announced by the Hong Kong Housing Authority on December 8
1997 we assign the value of ‘0’ to months prior to December 1997
and assigned the value of unity for months from December 1997
onwards.
Employment and total exports statistics are based on official
seasonally adjusted data. The real prime rate is simply defined as
nominal prime rate minus the rate of inflation for the comprehensive
consumer price index. For the list and definition of variables that
are analyzed, please refer to Table 9.
Empirical findings
Test One: The Relative Effects of TPS and Financial Crisis on
Transactions
In this test we attempt to assess the relative impacts of the
introduction of the TPS and the Asian Financial Crisis on
second-hand transaction volume. The length of the time series
allows us to use the Johansen cointegration method to test the long
term relationships of the key variables. The dependent variable for
the first test is the logarithm(log) of the second-hand home
transaction volume (LTRAN). The explanatory variables include
the log of the housing price index (LPPI), the log of the nominal
prime rate (LPR), the financial crisis dummy FCD, which is proxied
by the difference between the spot exchange rate and the one-year
forward rate, normalized as discussed above), and binary dummy
variables TPS(unity from 1997:12, 0 prior to this8), and FQR(1 for
first 3 months every year). It is expected that any increase in
7

The value of this dummy is therefore 1 at the point of most intensive pressure for
the currency to devalue and 0 when there were no such pressures. More recently
there were some episodes when the sign became negative so there was an expectation
for the currency to appreciate.
8
In November 2002 the Government announced a plan to terminate the TPS, but
termination will not be effective until after 2004, when the last batch of TPS units
have been sold.
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housing prices will allow homeowners to trade theirs for better ones
and thus tends to drive up transactions. On the other hand an
increase in interest rates will dampen transactions because this will
increase the costs of owning a new home or a better home.
We begin the analysis by examining the stationarity properties of
the variables using the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) Test
(Dickey and Fuller, 1981). The optimal lag in the test is chosen by
the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC). Table 5.1 shows that the test
statistics for all the series in level form and in their first differences,
respectively. The null hypothesis of unit root cannot be rejected
when the series are in level but can be rejected when the series are in
first differences, showing that all the series are integrated of order
one.
Since the variables are integrated of the same order (I(1)), we
can use the Johansen procedure(1988). Under this procedure, we
first identify the long-run relationship among LTRAN, LPPI, and
LPR. Following the common practice, the dummy variables FCD,
TPS and FQR are all treated as exogenous I(0) variables in the VAR
and the error-correction model.
The co-integration test results are presented in the Table 5.2. The
number of co-integrating vectors r is determined by reference to the
λmax and trace statistics. The lag specification for the Johansen test
is determined by Akaike’s Information Criterion (AIC). The results
show that TRAN, LPPI and LPR are cointegrated with only one
conitegrating vector..
Table 5.3 reports the normalized cointegrating coefficients that
will be interpreted as long run equilibrium coefficients. Coefficients
on both LPPI and LPR are significant with the expected signs. In
general, price appreciation provides an incentive and a greater ability
for homeowners to trade up, thus pushing up second hand
transaction. The interest rate, on the other hand, discourages home
purchases and tends to dampen transactions. In addition, given that
the variables are cointegrated, we then estimate the error correction
model as shown in Table 5.4. The ECM coefficient enters
11

significantly with negative sign. The significant negative ECM
coefficient confirms our earlier findings that cointegration exists
between them. It is noteworthy that the dampening effect of the
Tenants Purchase Scheme (TPS dummy) is greater than that of the
Asian Financial Crisis (AFC dummy) and is statistically much more
significant. (See Table 5.4 coefficients of the TPS and AFC dummy).
Because both the TPS dummy and the financial crisis dummy have
values between 0 and 1 their coefficients can be directly compared
with each other. We can see that the effect of the TPS is much bigger
and more significant than that of the financial crisis.
Test Two: Structural Break and Timing
In this test we identify the timing and the magnitude of a
structural break in the housing price equation. The housing price
equation is based on the assumption that the housing market was
essentially in equilibrium over the test period. When the housing
market was in equilibrium, housing prices reflect the bids from
buyers which increase when their incomes rise. We write a
housing price equation with two explanatory variables: exports of
goods and services which represents the key exogenous determinant
of incomes for a small open economy, and interest rates. We
dropped the inflation rate variable in the equation because this
variable did not carry a statistically significant coefficient.
Separate testing also shows that property price affects inflation
rather than inflation affects property price. Dropping the inflation
variable and testing alternatively timed dummy variables will allow
us to identify the timing and the magnitude of any structural change.
Two kinds of dummy variables—one for the intercept and one
“interactive dummy”—are used to capture any shift and change in
the magnitudes of key coefficients in the relationship. We switch
the dummy variables from 0 to unity in different quarters and assess
the t statistics on the coefficients.
We found that a structural
break occurred in the first quarter of 1998. Interestingly, this
coincides with our priors, since the Tenants Purchase
Scheme—which we have reason will have significant structural
changes on the housing market, was announced on December 8.
12

We use a fairly standard time series technique in this statistical
analysis, the Johansen co-integration procedure. We first check the
stationarity properties of the variables. The ADF test results show
that the null hypothesis of containing a unit root can only be rejected
when the series are first differenced. Thus the series are all
integrated of order one I(1)9. Since the variables are integrated of the
same order I(1), we can apply the Johansen procedure (1988). The
lag length of the VAR is determined by Akaike’s Information
Criterion (AIC). As is standard, both the slope and the intercept
dummy variables are treated as exogenous I(0) variables in the
co-integrating equation and the error correction model.
The cointegration test results for the model incorporating the
most significant dummy variables—switching to unity in the first
quarter of 1998—are presented in Table 6.1 through Table 6.4.
Table 6.1 presents evidence that LnPPI is cointegrated with the
LnEX and LnPRI.
Table 6.2 shows that the normalized
cointegrating coefficients on LnEx and LnPR carry the expected
signs and are statistically significant. The error correction model,
reported in Table 6.3, showing a statistically significant negative
coefficient on the ECM term, confirms the earlier findings that
cointegration exists between the variables.
Table 6.4 shows that the key coefficients, t statistics, and
adjusted R-squared for models with dummies switched on in
different quarters. Readers can testify that there is an obvious jump
in the t statistic and the goodness of fit when the switch occurred in
98Q1 rather than 97Q4. Since TPS was announced on December 8
this result is just right. The negative coefficient on the interactive
term for exports shows that exports growth no longer provided the
housing market the kind of support it used to; the positive coefficient
on the interactive term for the interest rate shows that a decline in
interest rates would not provide much stimulation either. The
positive intercept dummy term probably catches the effects of
various stimulative policies introduced by the government to
counteract the effects of the Asian Financial Crisis.
9

Test results are not reported on space considerations.
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Based on the estimated error correction model reported in Table
6.3, we have plotted the fitted values against the actual ones in the
Figure 1. The model tracks the actual data very well indeed.
Conclusion from the test: We found a structural break that occurred
in the first quarter of 1998, which is consistent with the hypothesis
that TPS caused the structural break. The stimulative effects of
exports on Hong Kong’s housing prices were reduced significantly
from the first quarter of 1998.
Test Three: Relationship between Housing Market and Employment
We investigated the long run relationship and causality between
employment (LnEMP) and residential property price (LnPPI) using
the Johansen procedure. The analysis began by examining the
stationarity properties of the variables using Augmented
Dickey-Fuller(ADF) Test. The test results show that the null
hypothesis of containing a unit root can only be rejected when the
series are in first differences indicating the both series: LnEMP and
LnPPI are integrated of order one I(1)10.
Since the variables are integrated of the same order I(1), the next
step is to carry out co-integration analyses of the variables. We first
identify the long-run causal relationships by using the Johansen
procedure (1988). The lag length of the VAR for each case is
determined by Akaike’s Information Criterion (AIC).
The cointegration test results are presented in Table 7.1. The
results show that the LnPPI is cointegrated with the LnEMP. Table
7.2 reports the normalized cointegrating coefficients which indicate
that the LnPPI has a positive and significant impact on the LnEMP.
It also confirms that the vector error correction model (VECM) is
appropriate for examining their long run causal relationships. The
coefficients of the error correction terms (ECM) and their t-statistics
are shown in Table 7.3. The ECM coefficients turn out to be
significant with negative sign when either LnPPI or LnEMP is
10

The test results are not reported here for space considerations.
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treated as the dependent variable. The significant negative ECM
coefficient, which indicates the channel of causality in the long run,
also confirms the earlier findings that cointegration exists between
them. Based on these results, we can conclude that there exists a
bi-directional causality between employment and property price.
Conclusion from the test: There is bi-directional causality between
housing price and employment.
4. Conclusions
Our empirical findings have shown that residential property
price, interest rates, the Asian Financial Crisis, and the
implementation of the Tenants Purchase Scheme are important
determinants of the second-hand home transaction volume. Price
appreciation allows existing homeowners to trade up for better
homes and boosts confidence. Interest rate increases are found to
have clearly dampening effects on housing market transactions. Of
particular interest is the finding that the Tenants Purchase Scheme is
found to have a significant and a greater negative effect on the
housing transactions than the Asian Financial Crisis.
During the mid-1990s, Hong Kong house prices appreciated
rapidly as funds poured in from among the richer public housing
tenants. After the Asian Financial Crisis, housing transactions have
eased and house prices have slipped.
At the eve of the
announcement of the TPS on 8 December 1997 housing market
transactions had appeared to have stabilized (Table 4), while
indicators of confidence in November appeared to be momentarily
restored (Table 3).
Yet in December home transactions
unexpectedly plunged to new lows, and home prices began their
dramatic downturn (Table 8).
Notwithstanding Hong Kong’s rapid economic growth in 2000
at 10.2 per cent home prices continued to fall, losing over 14 per
cent in the year. Our theory is that this has to do with the
immobilization of the existing homeowners as a result of TPS.
Because land developers from now on could only depend on
15

first-time buyers to buy their homes, they needed to keep reducing
their asking prices in order to reach potential buyers with a lower
purchasing power. This inevitably worsened the negative equity
problem, both by dragging more homeowners into the trap and
deepening the trap.
This has resulted in a serious credit crunch particularly for small
and medium enterprises who had now lost a collateral against which
they could get loans. This caused business activities to slow down
and certainly worsened the decline of commercial properties. Our
tests indicate that as housing prices decline employment falls. A
fall in employment in turn affects housing prices adversely creating
a vicious circle.
Although our hypothesis that TPS played an important role in
Hong Kong’s economic slump in 1998 stands, it does not follow that
privatization of public housing must necessarily cause such
problems. All the negative effects of the TPS may well have been
avoided if the government had adopted the Ho(1995) model of
privatization of public housing. Under that model, only those who
are poor enough to qualify for housing assistance could buy, while
resale of any sold units are restricted to “eligible” households.
Ho’s stipulation would have disqualified the richer tenants from
buying their units and would have retained the attractiveness of HOS
housing thus maintaining the liquidity that had been flowing into the
housing market. Given the huge linkage effect on the economy of
the
housing
market(Case,2000),
governments
pondering
privatization schemes need to learn from the experience in Hong
Kong.
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Table 1: Hong Kong’s Economic Growth 1961-2002(GDP % change)
Year

%
change

Year

%
change

Year

%
change

Year

%
change

Year

1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970

n.a.
14.2
15.7
8.6
14.5
1.7
1.7
3.3
11.3
9.2

1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980

7.1
10.3
12.4
2.3
0.3
16.2
11.7
8.5
11.5
10.1

1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990

9.2
2.7
5.7
10.0
0.4
10.8
13.0
8.0
2.6
3.4

1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000

5.1
6.3
6.1
5.3
3.9
5.3
5.1
-5.0
3.4
10.2

2001
2002#
2003#

%
change
0.5
2.3
3.3

Source: Gross Domestic Product 1961-1999, Government of HKSAR, plus updates
from: http://www.info.gov.hk/hkecon/gdp/index.htm
# Preliminary

Table 2: Employment Situation 1997:4 to 1999:4
Period

1997:4
1998:1
1998:2
1998:3
1998:4
1999:1
1999:2
1999:3
1999:4

Labour Force Employment Jobs Gained Unemployment
or Lost
Rate
(‘000)
3.297
3.247
3.258
3.290
3.310
3.297
3.326
3.316
3.340

3.2214
3.1414
3.1177
3.1143
3.1154
3.0928
3.1235
3.1016
3.1313

77.7
-80.0
-23.7
-3.4
1.1
-22.6
30.7
-21.9
29.7

2.2
3.3
4.3
5.2
5.9
6.3
6.1
6.3
6.3

Source: Census and Statistics Department
Note:
This Table shows that even after the Asian Financial Crisis, in the last
quarter of 1997, employment grew by 77,700. In the following quarter 80,000 jobs
were lost. The loss of housing market turnover as well as the decline in housing
prices subsequent to TPS translated into a loss of jobs.
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Table 3: Indicators of Changes of Confidence 1997:4-2000:4
Quarter or
Month
2000:4
2000:3
2000:2
2000:1
99:4
99:3
99:2
99:1
98:4
98:3
98:2
98:I
97:Dec
Nov.
Oct.

Hang Seng Index
At End of Period
15095
15649
16156
17406
16962
12733
13532
10942
10049
7883
8543
11519
10723
10527
10624

The US$ Premium on
the HK Dollar in the
1-Year Forward Market
-154
-142
-9
48
396
909
959
1547
1512
4235
4201
2396
4036
4055
2336

Source: Hong Kong Monetary Authority and http://finance.yahoo.com/q/hp?s=^HSI
Note:
Negative values suggest an expectation that the Hong Kong dollar would
appreciate in a year.
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Table 4: Monthly Transactions of Private Homes
Year/Month

First Hand Homes

Second Hand Homes

9707

2,147

17,227

9708

2,044

8,595

9709

1,396

7,800

9710

2,174

8,315

9711

1,343

8,653

9712

364

3,804

9701-9712

20,380

133,555

9801

2,334

3,598

9802

868

2,883

9803

2,636

5,501

9804

649

4,683

9805

2,429

4,364

9806

3,871

3,413

9807

1,880

3,337

9801-9812

31,599

48,110

9901

1,999

5,012

9907

1,394

4,317

9901-9912

21,557

46,565

0001

695

4,000

0007

2,400

2,929

0001-0012

17,830

39,089

0101

857

2,364

0109

1,109

3,221

Source: Centaline Property Agency Ltd.
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Table 5.1

Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test of Unit Root (Period: 1995 to 2004 )

Variable name

Test on

No Trend

Trend

Conclusion

TRAN

Level
1st diff

-1.9880
-13.1256

-2.4257**
-13.0912***

I(1)

LPPI

Level
1st diff

-0.7822
-2.8597

-5.6593**
-5.6401**

I(1)

LPR

Level
1st diff

-0.5627
-1.8002

-4.6590**
-4.6917**

I(1)

Note:
1. 95% critical value for the augmented Dickey-Fuller tests that include constant;
and constant plus
trend = 2.8900 and -3.4552 respectively.
2. The number of lags in the two unit root tests are determined by the AIC
3. ** indicates 5% significance level.

Table 5.2 Testing Cointegration using the Johansen Procedure
Cointegrating
Relation

Null
Alternative Test
Hypothesis Hypothesis Statistics

Critical
Values
(5%)

Critical
Values
(10%)

TRAN

Trace tests:

= f (LPPI, LPR)

r=0

r>0

79.0994*** 31.54

28.78

With exogenous

r≦1

r>1

5.4318

17.86

15.75

Trace Value

dummy variables
FCD, TPS and FQR
λ max tests:

λ max Value

r=0

r=1

73.6676*** 21.12

19.02

r=1

r=2

5.0776

12.98

14.88

Notes:
1. *** denotes significance at 1% level
2. r indicates the number of cointegrating vectors
3. As individual series clearly exhibits trending pattern, we consider regressions
with unrestricted constant and restricted trend

20

Table 5.3 Normalized Cointegrating Coefficients Using the Johansen Procedure
Variables

Coefficient

t-statistic

LPPI

1.0114

7.0094***

LPR

-0.2155

2.0917**

Note: ** and *** denotes significance at 5% and 1% level respectively

Table 5.4. Error Correction Model (Dependent variable:ΔTRAN)
Regressors

Coefficient (t-ratio)

ΔTRAN(-1)

-0.0263 (-0.2474)

ΔTRAN(-2)
ΔLPPI(-1)
ΔLPPI(-2)
ΔLPR(-1)
ΔLPR(-2)

-0.02818 (-0.3036)
3.3477 (4.1674)***
2.0245 (2.3967)**
-1.7724 (-1.7189)*
0.7121 (0.6895)
0.2291 (4.6053)***
-0.1603 (-1.6199)*
-0.2233 (-3.7519)***
-0.0993 (-2.2092)**
-0.8351 (-6.6350)***

Constant
FCD
TPS
FQR
ECMt-1
Adj R-squared: 0.4347

Note: *, ** and *** denotes 10%, 5% and 1% significance level respectively
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Table 6.1 Testing Cointegration between LnPPI, LnEx and LnPR using the
Johansen Procedure with dummy variables, 1984Q1 to 2002Q3
Explanatory
Variables

Null
Hypothesis

Alternative
Hypothesis

Test
Statistics

LnPPI = f (LnEx, LnPR) Trace tests:
r=0
r≦1

r>0
r>1

Trace Value
42.33**
17.30

λ max tests:
r=0
r=1

r=1
r=2

λ max Value
25.02**
16.74*

Notes:
1. ** denotes significance at 5% level
2. r indicates the number of cointegrating vectors.
3. VAR = 2 is determined by AIC criterion

Table 6.2 Normalized Cointegrating Coefficients Using the Johansen Procedure
Cointegrating equation:
LnPPI = f (LnEX, LnPR)

Coefficient

t-statistic

LnPR

-0.5224

-1.9180*

LnEX

0.6986

2.6890**

Notes:
1. ** and * denotes significance at 5% and 10% level respectively.
2. optimal lags are determined by AIC criterion
3. LnEx*D98q1, LnPr*D98q1 and D98q1 are treated as exogenous I(0) variables in
the cointegrating equation
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Table 6.3 Error Correction Representation of Johansen Model
(Dependent variable:ΔLnPPIt)
Regressors

Coefficient (t-ratio)

Intercept

-0.4652 (-3.6727)***

Trend

0.0028 (3.3701)***

∆LnPPIt-1

0.4504 (4.2074)***

∆LnEXt-1

-0.3313 (-1.7721)*

∆LnPRt-1

0.0278 (0.4618)

ECMt-1

-0.1669 (-3.9358)***

LnEX * D98Q1

-0.3622 (-1.9930)**

LnPR * D98Q1

0.1636 (2.3551)**

D98Q1
Adj R-squared: 0.5300

4.2173 (1.8136)*

Note:
1. optimal lags are determined by AIC criterion
2. * , ** and *** denotes 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels respectively
3. Δdenotes first difference.

Table 6.4
Quarters

A Timing Test by Switching Dummy Variables to Unity in Different

Intercept
Dummy DQ

Adjusted R2 in
ECM model

Quarter with
Value of Dummy
Switched to Unity

LnEX * DQ

LnPR * DQ

1997 Q2

-0.0036
(-0.0213)

-0.0187
(-0.3253)

0.0254
(0.0114)

0.4399

1997 Q3

0.0040
(0.0235)

-0.0206
(-0.3616)

-0.0716
(-0.0322)

0.4408

1997 Q4

-0.0116
(-0.0679)

-0.0054
(-0.0904)

0.1015
(0.0452)

0.4350

1998 Q1

-0.3622
(-1.9930)**

0.1636
(2.3551)**

4.2173
(1.8136)*

0.5300

1998 Q2

-0.2483
(-1.3515)

0.1335
(1.9677)**

2.8794
(1.2134)

0.4520

1998 Q3

-0.2829
(-1.5453)

0.1435
(2.1206)**

3.2985
(1.3943)

0.4634

Note:
Figures are estimated coefficients and the adjusted R2 for the error
correction models. t-statistics are in brackets. DQ is a dummy variable that switches
to unity in the quarter on the left column.
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Table 7.1: Testing Cointegration between LnEMP and LnPPI using the Johansen
Procedure, 1984Q1 to 2002Q3
Explanatory
Variables

Null
Hypothesis

Alternative
Hypothesis

Test
Statistics

LnEMP = f (LnPPI)

Trace tests:
r=0
r≦1

r>0
r>1

Trace Value
20.14**
3.05

λ max tests:
r=0
r=1

r=1
r=2

λ max Value
17.09***
3.05

Notes:
1. ** denotes significance at 5% level.
2. r indicates the number of cointegrating vectors.
3. optimal lags are determined by AIC criterion

Table 7.2 Normalized Cointegrating Coefficients (Bivariate Estimates) Using
the Johansen Procedure
Cointegrating equation:
LnEMP = f (LnPPI)

Coefficient

t-statistic

Intercept

0.8081

6.1108***

LnPPI

0.0633

2.4376**

Notes:
1. ** and *** denote significance at 5% and 1% respectively.
2. optimal lags are determined by AIC criterion
3. ** and *** denote significance at 5% and 1% level.

Table 7.3 Causality Tests Using the VECM Approach
Dependent Null Hypothesis
Variable

Coefficient
for ECM(-1)

t-statistics
for ECM(-1)

DLEMP

LnPPI does not cause LnEMP

-0.0684

-3.3752**

DLPPI

LnEMP does not cause LnPPI

-0.1777

-2.4483**

Notes:
1. ** denotes significance at 5%.
2. D denotes first difference
3. optimal lags are determined by AIC criterion
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Table 8: Housing Price Index(Overall)
Year & Month

Price Index

9701
9702
9703
9704
9705
9706
9707
9708
9709
9710
9711
9712
9806
9812
9906
9912
0006
0012
0106
0112

142.7
154.3
162.2
157.0
172.3
172.0
167.2
171.1
170.3
172.9
160.5
155.0
112.5
104.6
102.3
95.7
86.0
81.8
80.9
73.8

Percentage Change
6.1
8.1
5.1
-3.2
9.7
-0.2
-2.8
2.3
-0.5
1.5
-7.2
-3.4
-27.4
-7.0
-2.2
-6.5
-10.1
-4.9
-1.1
-8.8

Source: Rating and Valuation Department
Note:
From 1998 the percentage price changes are reported for every six months.
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Table 9. List of variables and their definitions
Short Form Explanatory Variables

Definition of Variables

TRAN

Second hand home
transaction volume
(dependent variable)

Monthly volume figures are no.
of registration of transactions in
private residential properties in
the second hand market and
provided by Centaline Ltd.

PPI

Property Price Index

Property price index

FCD

Financial Crisis Dummy

This is a non-binary dummy
variable derived from the
12-month forward rate premium
of the US dollar on the HK
dollar. It is normalized to have
a maximum value of unity .

TPS

Tenants Purchase Scheme

1
starting
from
the
announcement of the scheme in
December 1997, 0 before that
month (Monthly Data)

FQR

First Quarter Effect

1 for months in the first quarter
of the year, 0 otherwise

PR

Prime Rate

moving average of the prime
rate for 3 quarters ending in the
current quarter

EX

Total Exports of Goods and
Services

In million HKD (current price),
seasonally adjusted

D98Q1

Dummy Variable

1 starting from the 1998 1st
quarter, 0 before that quarter
(Quarterly Data)

DQ

Timing Test Dummy

1 starting from the quarter
tested, 0 prior to that quarter

EMP

Employment

in
thousands,
adjusted
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seasonally

Figure 1. Predicted Values for the Housing Price Index Using JH Model
Incorporating Dummy Variables Switched to Unity from 1998:quarter 1

7

LnPPI

6

5

Actual LPPI
4

Predicted LPPI (with intercept and
slope dummy 1998Q1 onwards=0)

Quarter

3
Q3 84 Q2 86 Q1 88 Q4 89 Q3 91 Q2 93 Q1 95 Q4 96 Q3 98 Q2 00 Q1 02
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